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America's intelligence capability is one of the cornerstones of our national security. Thus I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you about intelligence today. I think it significant that as little as 5 or 10 years or so ago such a talk might not have been possible. Intelligence activities were just not talked about in those days - they were regarded as totally secretive. My predecessors, if you had invited them - which you probably would not have - very likely would have declined.

But in recent years, events like Vietnam and Watergate propelled intelligence activities into the headlines. Allegations followed allegations; investigating committees were established; reporters dug for stories; former agents wrote books - and very soon it became hard to separate truth from myth. The result of it all is that the Intelligence Community has been undergoing profound changes and today is operating more in the open than it ever has in its history.

Well you might ask, can we continue to do our job satisfactorily under these conditions? Can we reverse the practice and tradition of total secrecy about intelligence and still remain effective?

Let me say that I believe we can - not in spite of being more open, but because of being more open. Being more open is being more American and therefore has real advantages to us.

First, no agency of our government can survive over the long run unless it has the support of the American public. In the past we in intelligence had that support. We had it on faith and on the assumption that it was better for the public not to know about essentially secret intelligence activities. Our intelligence agencies never worked to develop public understanding of what they did. Consequently, in 1975 and '76 when the Intelligence Community was under severe criticism, the public had no means of balancing the allegations of abuses against the many successes which had been achieved.

Today, greater openness permits us to begin rebuilding public confidence by increasing your knowledge and your understanding of what we are doing. My being here today is part of our commitment to greater openness. I and my deputy, Ambassador Frank Carlucci, talk to about a half dozen groups in various parts of the country every month. Beyond this, we are being more responsive to inquiries from the media. We still say "no comment" a lot; but the needle is no longer stuck in that groove. Finally, being more open by publishing more of the end product of our intelligence efforts. Please note that all of these are controlled responses by responsible authorities; not an opening of the gates for every member of

our profession to say what he wants to. Clearly we must and do avoid discussing that which simply must be kept secret. For instance, I mentioned our publications - we are now publishing, on the average, two unclassified studies every week. We do this by reviewing each study done by the Intelligence Community to determine whether, if we deleted what absolutely has to be kept secret, would the study still contribute to public understanding of an important issue. If so, then it is declassified and published.

The subject matter ranges from energy prospects, to international terrorism, to international economic statistics, to our latest study which is on Soviet Civil Defense.

You benefit from this publication effort because it has moved much information into the public domain which might otherwise have remained classified. At the same time, we benefit through the comments and suggestions that each of these studies has generated.

For example, in March of 1977 our study of the outlook for the production of oil in the Soviet Union predicted that somewhere in the next 3 to 8 years the Soviets would be unable to take from the ground enough oil to meet their growing needs. Not everyone agreed with our prediction, consequently there were a number of letters and newspaper articles critical of the study. I wrote personally to each critic asking that he be specific and tell me exactly where he differed with us and why. I then invited those who replied to come to our Headquarters for a day to sit down with our economic analysts and discuss our differences. I know that our analysts benefitted from

that exchange, from having to stand up to a group of experts and to defend their ideas.

A second major advantage to us of a policy of openness is that it enables us to keep the necessary secrets more securely. If that sounds a bit contradictory, let me explain. By sharing as much as we can with the public, we are, in effect, helping to keep the quantity of secret information which we must protect as small as possible. A major problem today is that so much data is unnecessarily classified secret that custodians of it lose respect for the secret label. I can assure you that protecting our true secrets has become a critical problem, for our country. Every reporter today seems to dream of becoming a Woodward or a Bernstein. Recently the president of one of our top universities said that whereas a few years ago every student wanted to go into medicine, today they see journalism as the route to fame and fortune. The rewards and satisfaction from criticizing our society, from revealing its faults and its warts, have come to be perceived as greater than the rewards for helping to build it. Too often today every public servant is suspect - every renegade whistle-blower is an automatic hero.

Ladies and gentlemen, when there is little trust of elected or appointed officials; and when destroying is preferred by many to building, we are in trouble. Let me assure you, nonetheless, that I regard what Woodward and Bernstein did for our country to have been a most commendable public service.

But, let us not forget that when they were finished, somebody had to step in and begin the job of building again.

Unquestionably there has been too much secrecy in the past. There should be less secrecy in government. But secrecy in itself is neither good nor bad, moral nor immoral. It is simply a fact that some things cannot be done without the assurance of some degree of confidentiality.

This is particularly true with respect to intelligence. Today our country has a legitimate need to know what is going on around the world because the activities of so many other nations affect us directly - yet many of those nations are closed societies. If we reveal exactly how we are obtaining this necessary information, surely our sources will be turned off. Look back to World War II, what good would it have done us to have broken the German and Japanese codes if we had let them know that we had done it. Some secrecy is necessary in all governments and in particular in intelligence operations. The issue is, where secrets must be kept, how can you, the public, be sure that secrecy is not imposed simply for bureaucratic convenience or perhaps to cover up misdeeds?

Well, out of the crucible of these past few years of intense public criticism of our intelligence activities, a new process of checks and balances has been forged to oversee intelligence operations. Individuals and groups in both the Executive and Legislative branches of the government now act for the public as surrogate overseers. In short, if the

public can not have full access to what we do, then there must be surrogates who do. Who are these surrogates?

First there are the President and the Vice President, who today take a very active, intense interest in all intelligence activities. I report to the President in person weekly and keep him well abreast of what we are doing. He and the Vice President give me frequent and specific guidance.

Next, two and one-half years ago an Intelligence Oversight Board reporting to the President was established. Today it consists of three distinguished Americans: former Senator Gore from Tennessee, former Governor Scranton of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Thomas Farmer, an attorney, of Washington, D.C. These three gentlemen oversee the legality and the propriety of intelligence activities. Anyone in the intelligence community, or any citizen, may communicate with them directly, calling to their attention problems, abuses, or wrongdoing. They will investigate that complaint and report what they believe should be done directly to the President.

Also, there are two committees of Congress which were created in the last two years specifically to oversee the intelligence process, one in the Senate, another in the House of Representatives. These committees require me to testify before them regularly. I am completely forthright with them and keep them well informed. They are helpful in providing me advice; and yet scrupulous in investigating any activity which they consider may be questionable.

I think that these processes give much greater assurance than was possible in the past that we are not acting in ways which the American public would not support, or that do not conform to American foreign policy. I think that there are adequate mechanisms here for so-called whistle-blowers if they were sincere in their desire to reform rather than reap praise or profit. I would respect their whistle-blowing much more if they would at least try these established oversight procedures first, because through them classified information can be protected. Only in extremis do they need to take it upon themselves to release information that could gravely damage this nation.

Let me be perfectly candid, there are also risks which must be accepted with oversight. First, the greater number of people who know a secret - whoever they may be - the greater the chance of a leak. Beyond this, the more deeply overseers delve into specific operations, the more inclined they will be not just to oversee, but to attempt to manage intelligence operations in addition. Here, as anywhere else, too many cooks can spoil the broth.

So a balance must be reached: enough oversight to assure the public; not so much as to hobble our intelligence agencies. The mechanism is working well today, but it is new. We will need another year or two more to ensure that we have achieved the best balance.

Is it worth the effort? Yes, because oversight also strengthens intelligence capability. The checks provide reassurance both to the public and to the Intelligence Community itself. Beyond this, it is easier to manage an organization which is held closely accountable. In a business like ours it is easy to be blinded by dedicated enthusiasm, and to take chances that may not be warranted. It is less easy when outsiders must be told what you are doing and when skeptics must be convinced. Accountability gives you standards against which to measure actions.

Thus I am saying to you that in my view the risks of openness and oversight are more than counterbalanced by the positive values: the greater sense of support from the public; the greater protection of our secrets by narrowing the scope of what must be protected; the greater assurance against abuses; and the greater management control that can be exercised.

There are two other exciting developments in intelligence today that I would like to mention briefly. First, our techniques for gathering data are changing remarkably. There are two basic ways by which we collect intelligence information: the traditional human agent or spy; and what we call technical devices, such as cameras, signals listening posts and such. The expansion of capabilities on the technical side has been extremely impressive. Because of the advanced state of technology in our country, it is one of the great advantages we possess in the field of intelligence. Today the quantity



of data provided by these sophisticated technical techniques is almost overwhelming. Such technically collected data, however, generally tells us what happened yesterday or maybe today. If we want insights into why those events happened, or into what may happen tomorrow - that is if we are looking for someone's thoughts, intentions, plans - we still must rely on the individual on the scene in a foreign country. The human spy remains indispensable today. The real challenge today is to make the efforts of technology and the human agent complement each other. Each should fill the blanks in the puzzle that the other cannot fill. We are challenged to develop true teamwork. *Pres order - coordinate - Not over interpretation*

The second new development I wanted to mention, is a shift in emphasis on what our intelligence efforts should be producing. If we look back thirty years to when a central intelligence activity was first organized in our country, the primary product of intelligence was information about Soviet military affairs. That was perceived as the principal threat to the country, so it became the principal concern of all of our intelligence agencies. Look at how the world around has changed since then. Today our country is involved with many countries around the world. The Soviet Union and its immediate satellites, while important, are but one of the areas in which we are interested. We have intercourse with most of the 150-some nations of the world. That intercourse is related much more to political and economic matters than it is to

the military. Accordingly, we have had to encompass in our focus economics and politics as well as military concerns; and over a much wider range of geography than heretofore.

Let me not overstate the case to you. Our primary intelligence concern must continue to be the military posture of the Soviet Union because that continues to be our most serious threat. But beyond that, the intelligence community has had to expand its horizons, its capabilities, and its areas of technical expertise to embrace problems like international drug trafficking, grain harvests, international terrorism, political movements, energy forecasts, medical prognostications on world leaders, and so on. It is a new and demanding challenge. It is one that is as important today as ever before, simply because events in foreign countries have a more direct impact on our country and even on us as individuals than ever before in our history.

Thus, we in our Intelligence Community must operate in a new and more open environment, but we must also expand the types of information which we provide to our nation's leadership in helping them to make good decisions for all of us.

In short, this is an exciting, an important time for us in intelligence. What we are doing is evolving a distinctly American model of intelligence - a model which truly reflects our American values and at the same time permits us to maintain our intelligence capability as the best in the world. We are the best today. I assure you that I intend for us to stay on top.

I can assure you that protecting our true secrets has become a critical problem for our country. The discovery and revelation of classified information is becoming an end in itself. Recently the president of one of our top universities said that whereas a few years ago every student wanted to go into medicine, today they see journalism as the route to fame and fortune. The rewards and satisfaction from criticizing our society, from revealing its faults and warts, is perceived as greater than for helping to build it. Too often today every public servant is suspect - every renegade whistle-blower is an automatic hero.

Ladies and gentlemen, when there is little trust of elected or appointed officials; and when destroying is preferred by many to building, we are in trouble.

Reporters like Woodward and Bernstein, in my opinion, have performed a most commendable service for our country. But, too often, it is forgotten that objectivity is the hallmark of responsible reporting and when the criticism is finished, someone must step in and begin the job of building again.